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THE VIRGINIA QUARTERLY REVIEW

THE MARSHALL COURT AND THE WRITING
OF LAW AND HISTORY
By ALFRED S. KONEFSKY
The Mllrshall Court and Cultural Ch(lnge, 1815-35, Vols. 3 and 4. Dy G.
Edward White. Macmillan. $95.00. (Part of the 11-volume series, Tlie
Oliver Wendell 1-/olmes Devise History ofthe Supreme Cour·t ofthe United
States, edited by Paul A. Fre und and Stanley N. Katz.)

M

ore than 30 years ago the Congress of the United
States created the Permanent Committee for the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise. The Committee's
function, "with the aid of the [residual] estate left by" Justice
Holmes to the United States, was to oversee the preparation
of a multi..volume History of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Now into its fourth decade, the project has had
a somewhat fitful progress. Not all of the volumes have been
completed, though those that- have been published have
been lavishly produced. L(~ttered, sealed, and brocaded in
gold as befits their importan~e, the volumes are also long,
weighty, and expensive. Though Justice Holmes intended to
leave his estate to his country, his legacy has been confined
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primarily to library shelves and academic debates. At almost
one hundred dollars a volume, it is unlikely that the "people"
of the United States will have much opportunity to own the
books prepared in his honor. In addition, the books are hard
to find in bookstores as a result of the publisher's erratic
distribution policy.
From the start, the Devise series has been plagued with a
number of intellectual problems. First, the authors seemed to
operate under a special burden, a kind of "last word" syn
drome. Being charged with the responsibility of writing the
definitive, exhaustive study often meant extensive research
into primary sources so that one could be absolutely confi
dent about the documentary record before putting pen to
paper. Writing under this burden also meant special care
and evaluation of the record before judgments were made
and defended. Most of the volumes were assigned to law
professors, who tend to be very cautious anyway about what
they write. Writing for the ages not surprisingly has taken
ages.
Second, the volumes were organized basically around the
somewhat arbitrary category of the tenure of the chief jus
tices. This practice had the virtue of imposing manageable
guidelines and demarcations on the authors; one knew where
one was supposed to begin and end. The problem is that not
all history can be placed in such tidy settings; events do not
just begin and end; sometimes they overlap, disappear and
reappear, are transformed and recast. History, of course, has
the nasty habit of escaping from the clutches of even the
most convincing of labels, pa1ticularly those imposed for the
most artificial of reasons. The emphasis on using various
"courts"-the Marshall Court, the Taney Court-as the orga
nizing premise for the writing of a definitive history, has,
ironically, rendered the historical record occasionally ahis
torical.
Finally, some of the volumes, written over a long period of
time, have not sufficiently taken into account contemporary
scholarship outside of law that might have illuminated un-
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derstanding of legal or constitutional matters. The studies
have tended to be highly detailed with little or no organizing
theory. For example, Professor Julius Goebel's volume on
the early years of the Court, though written with his charac
teristic technical facility and virtuosity, made virtually no
mention of modern scholarship on the political and ideolog
ical controversies in the immediate post-Revolutionary pe
riod. Law was rendered as virtually autonomous, unrelated to
the world outside.
In striking contrast stands G. Edward White's exceptional
contribution to the Holmes Devise, volumes 3 and 4 (bound
together) in the series, The Marshall Court and Cultural
Change, 1815-1835. (In the early history of the series, the
Marshall Court years were divided, and the years 1801-1815
were placed in a previous volume, separately authored,
number 2 in the series.) Though assigned authorship to the
two volumes just within this decade, White finished them
with dispatch. Trained in both law and history, White brings
his command of both disciplines to this book. In particular,
he provides his insight not only to historical theory, but also
to the relationship between history and law. The product is
clearly the best of the Holmes Devise volumes to date, and
more generally, if separated from the series, an important
landmark in legal and constitutional history.
Why is White's volume so successful? Primarily because
White has managed to apply lessons gathered from critical
debates about the methodology and substantive content of
early 19th-century American legal and constitutional history.
He has insisted that the writing of an internal, autonomous
legal history, focusing purely on doctrinal or institutional
history, is not sufficient. There must be other modes of
historical explanation that help us to understand how legal
events are shaped and understood. The primary intellectual
framework for this book about law remains essentially out
side of law, though law is clearly embedded within the
framework. This is not to say that technical legal problems
and developments are overlooked, but even technical con-
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cerns, though explained within their own terms, are opened
up to larger modes and categories of explanation. And, in
organizing his inquiry, White has placed substantial empha
sis on developments in the legal historiography of the last
half-century or so-particularly law and culture, and the
related sphere of law and politics.
White begins his description of the Marshall Court by
stipulating that "[t]he extended argument of this study is that
the decisions of the Marshall Court cannot be separated from
the distinctive cultural ethos in which they originated." To
this end, he starts his search for the cultural ethos not in law,
or judicial opinions, or legal rules (as one might expect in a
book about law), but in James Fenimore Cooper's novels.
Why? Because White seeks through literature to ascertain
what ideas and beliefs were most widely disseminated
throughout society during the period of the Marshall Court.
By analyzing literature and other sources, White identifies
the central cultural idea around which he believes the
Marshall Court organized its legal thought-republicanism.
The subject of repub1icanism has dominated the historiog
raphy of the early republic for the last two decades. The
inquiries have been both backward looking and forward
looking. In both history and law, scholars have offered
explanations attempting to give meaning and understanding
to the past. In law, particularly constitutional law, renewed
intellectual interest in republicanism has also pointed toward
the future. Republicanism in the hands of modernists has
emerged as a "new" social theory, a possible model for future
discourse, centering around the tension between community
and individual. The scholarly debate has been prolix and
complex on a number of fronts. Controversy has emerged
over a sophisticated, working definition of republicanism, the
relationship between republicanism and economic liberal
ism, and the general impact of republicanism on early Amer
ican society. Drawing on these academic discussions, White
has made at least two important contributions to our under
standing of republicanism: he has summarized and presented
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the most useful strands of the argument about the meaning of
republicanism, and he has demonstrated how a version of
republican ideology had an impact on law and the Marshall
Court. We might occasionally quibble with White over par
ticular definitions and interpretations, but this would not
detract from his overall argument. White has a theory about
how the Marshall Court operated, and his evidence is pre
sented impressively.
White argues that "Marshall Court jurisprudence can be
seen as heavily influenced by a special version of republi
canism, a version that represented a fusion of classical repub
licanism and other trans-Atlantic ideologies." He is also
aware of what he terms the "accommodation of republican
theory to cultural change." In his presentation of republican
ism, White emphasizes "classical" elements focusing on
civic virtue and participation coupled with wide distribution
of property, in a republic administered by an educated
hierarchy fending off corruption. White believes that over
time this pure classical form increasingly "fused," or at least
found itself "in awkward juxtaposition" with the rise of
economic liberalism. The fusion helped create America's
"special version of republicanism." Rather than the classic
republican subordination of "individual self-interest to the
good of society as a whole," liberalism "was founded on the
premise that individual self-fulfillment could be best encour
aged by allowing individuals to pursue their ... self
interests." In particular White argues that the tensions be
tween classical republicanism and liberalism often focused
on the meaning of property rights and the content and scope
of commerce. He notes that,
[W]hile liberalism shared with classical republicanism a
sense that property was an important foundation of society,
its advocates tended to emphasize the role of property as a
source of economic freedom and productivity rather than as a
source of political and social stability. Liberalism also tended
to encourage the pursuit of commerce for both individual
self-fulfillment and social improvement; commerce has been
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identified by classical republicanism as a source of luxury
and decay.
White finds within this fusion or tension, placed in the
context of a spreading market economy, the principal constit
uent elements of the cultural influences on Marshall Court
jurisprudence.
But the tension between overlapping ideologies does not
necessarily resolve the question about why particular results
were reached in individual Supreme Court cases. Rather, as
White so ably demonstrates, the recognition of the Court's
attempt to fuse traditions assists us in understanding how the
ideological parameters were formed for debate within the
Marshall Court. As readers, we get to see the choices the
justices faced, and not the inevitability of the outcomes. In
other words, White helps us see the cases as the Court saw
them, sometimes as confused, garbled, and incoherent;
sometimes clear as crystal. As a result, some traditional
interpretations of landmark cases-for instance in the con
tract clause, commerce clause, and natural law and racial
minority (slavery and Indians) areas-take on new light.
White forces us to rethink old categories, and, though we
might disagree (sometimes the republican framework might
appear forced), the evidence is compelling enough to stimu
late us to reconsider old ways of thinking.
Since the Marshall Court in White's hands is uniquely
situated as "a Court of its time"-that is as a court heavily
influenced by the cultural ethos of its period-it should come
as no surprise that the Court was perceived by some contem
poraries, and perceived itself, as an important political actor
in the early history of the republic. But historical reverence
for the Marshall Court as one of our nation's primary judicial
and institutional artifacts is in part based on assumptions
about the Court's apolitical and neutral nature. White per
ceptively notes the tightrope the Court walked:
To conclude, therefore, that the Court succeeded in sepa
rating law from politics, or in establishing itself as a neutral
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nonpartisan force is to read only some of the contemporary
commentary and to emphasize only some of the Court's
language. It is clear that during Marshall's tenure the Court
had an interest in fostering an impression of itself as re
moved from politics and faithful to the impersonal dictates
of the law. It is also clear that the Court succeeded remark
ably in establishing that impression in public consciousness.
But it is not at all clear that the Court's opinions were
nonpartisan, or even that they were so perceived by those
who followed its actions closely. Perhaps the most one
can say is that Marshall and his colleagues were convinced
that the de-emphasis of overt partisanship and the emphasis
of a judicial obligation to subordinate individual discretion
ary choice to the "discretion of the law" was an important
means of gaining legitimacy for their pronouncements. To
say that is not to say that the Court elevated law about
politics. It is rather to say that the Court established a strat
egy whose purpose was to distinguish law from politics,
and that the distinction between law and politics, and be
tween legal and individual discretion, was accepted as a
respectable intellectual proposition by the Court's contem
poraries.
The Marshall Court relished its participation in the cultural
fray, because as a body it sensed that important political
principles were at stake. White helps us to identify these
"distinctive" cultural features that forged the Court's "intel
lectual assumptions."
That culture was one in which an established belief structure
was confronting unmistakable evidence of social change.
The attitudes of the belief structure toward change were
themselves distinctive, and three such attitudes have re
ceived particular emphasis.... One was the unresolved
tension between an assumption that change represented
progress and an assumption that change should be equated
with cultural decay and disintegration. A second was the
effort to respond to change by the systematization and
organization of areas of knowledge, reflected in the attempts
of jurists to articulate scientific legal principles. A third
was the rediscovery and recasting of the revolutionary his
tory of the American republic reflected in Marshall Court
opinions and in contemporary apologists for the Court. What
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links these three developments? One linkage, I would sug
gest, can be found in a distinctive attitude toward the past
as a source of guidance for the present. The exercise of
looking backward in time was not an exercise that yielded,
for Marshall's contemporaries, the insight that civiliza
tion was in a constant process of change, nor the insight
that the future could never fully replicate the past. The
exercise of contrasting the past to the present and recast
ing the past was, for early-nineteenth-century Americans,
a way of identifying and reasserting first principles, that
is, values, beliefs, and rules that remained unchanged over
time.
To focus merely on White's argument and intellectual
structure in these volumes may, in a curious way, underesti
mate his considerable achievement. This is a definitive
volume, prodigiously researched and gracefully written. In
addition to addressing all the critical and famous constitu
tional cases in their contexts, White has exhaustively ana
lyzed nonconstitutional and private law cases so frequently
ignored. He has offered sound insights into the working
life of the Court and shrewd judgments about interactions
among the justices which contribute to a reassessment
of Marshall's personal influence on the Court. White has
also provided deft and subtle portraits of each of the judges,
the (often overlooked) court reporters, as well as the promi
nent lawyers who dominated the dockets. We should be
grateful to White for producing a volume that fulfills
the promise of the Holmes Devise. He has convincingly
presented a theory about law and cultural change, empha
sizing the time-bound quality of law, demonstrating the
futility of pursuing its autonomous nature, and reminding
us that, in one respect or another, all courts are courts of their
time.
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